We exploit the presence of a subfield to solve the NTRU problem for large moduli q: norming-down the public key h to a subfield may lead to an easier lattice problem, and any sufficiently good solution may be lifted to a short vector in the full NTRU-lattice. We restrict ourselves to choices of dimensions n(λ) and modulus q(λ) that were previously thought to offer resistance against attacks in time exponential in the security parameter λ. For any superpolynomial q(λ), the subfield attack can be made sub-exponential in λ, or even polynomial as q(λ) gets larger. The subfield lattice attack directly affects the asymptotic security of the bootstrappable homomorphic encryption schemes LTV and YASHE. It also makes GGH-like Multilinear Maps vulnerable to principal ideals attacks -therefore leading to a quantum break -and almost vulnerable to a statistical attack a-la Gentry-Szydlo. No encodings of zero nor zero-testing parameter are required. We also provide meaningful practical experiments. Using just LLL in dimension 512 we obtain vectors that would have required running BKZ with block-size 130 in dimension 8192. Finally, we discuss concrete aspects of this attack, the potential immunity of NTRUEncrypt and Bliss parameters, issue preliminary recommendations and suggest countermeasures.
Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography relies on the presumed hardness of lattice problems such as the shortest vector problem (SVP) and its variants. For efficiency, many practical lattice-based cryptosystems are based on assumptions on structured lattices such as the NTRU lattice. Introduced by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [HPS96, HPS98] , the NTRU assumption states that it is hard to find a short vector in the R-module that the celebrated LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [LLL82] would lead to an attack. However, it turned out [HPS98] that much stronger lattice reduction is required and that the NTRUencrypt scheme is asymptotically secure. Meanwhile, parameters have been updated to take account for progress in lattice reduction and potential quantum speed-ups [HPS + 15].
Other types of attack have been considered, such as Odlyzko's meet-in-the-middle attack described in [JHW06] . In practice, the best known algorithm for attacking NTRU lattices is the combined lattice-reduction and meet-in-the-middle attack of Howgrave-Graham [HG07]. Asymptotically, a slightly sub-exponential attack against the ternary-NTRU problem was proposed by Kirchner and Fouque [KF15] , with a heuristic complexity 2 Θ(n/ log log q) , which is to our knowledge the only sub-exponential attack when q is polynomial in n.
As of today, those NTRU lattices remained essentially as intractable as lattices with similar parameters 4 , but without the structure of R-module. An exception -discussed below-is an attack of Gentry [Gen01] tackling the case of composite rings.
In the present work, we describe how to use lattice reduction in a subfield to attack the NTRU assumption for large moduli q. This subfield lattice attack is asymptotically faster than the previously known attacks as soon as q is super-polynomial, and may also be relevant for polynomially-sized q.
Asymptotics. We are mostly concerned with the NTRU assumption when q is super-polynomial in n, in which case the best known attacks are already sub-exponential in n. For cryptographic relevance, we will therefore state all our asymptotics in terms of what was previously thought as the security parameter λ: given q = q(λ) we constrain n = n(λ) so that the previously best known attack requires exponential time 2 Θ(λ) .
In this cryptographic metric, the subfield lattice attack is sub-exponential as soon as q is super-polynomial, and gets polynomial for larger parameters q = 2Θ (λ) = 2Θ ( √ n) .
Our contribution. We present a new subfield lattice attack which consists of norming down to a subfield, running lattice reduction to solve a smaller, easier lattice problem and lifting the solution back up. We then show that the proposed algorithm solves the NTRU problem in sub-exponential time when the modulus q is quasi-polynomial in the security parameter λ and in polynomial time when the modulus q is super-exponential in λ (equivalently, q = 2Θ ( √ n) ). Applying this algorithm, we show that it gives a subexponential attack on parameter choices for NTRU-based FHE schemes [LTV12, BLLN13] which were believed secure previously. We also show that this algorithm enables new attacks on GGH-like graded encoding schemes [GGH13a, LSS14, ACLL15] . These attacks lead to subexponential classical and polynomial-time quantum attacks on GGH-like constructions. We stress that our attacks do not require encodings of zero nor do they use the zero-testing parameter in contrast to previous work [HJ15] .
We also report on experimental results for the subfield lattice attack which show that the attack is meaningful in practice. Using LLL in dimension 512 we have obtained vectors that would have required running BKZ with block-size about 130 in dimension 8192. We note that the behavior of the lattice reduction algorithms on the special instances considered in this work seems not to be captured by current lattice reduction models: we are yet unable to provide practical predictions for the hidden constants in our asymptotic results. there exists a projection π : R → R 1 that is a ring morphism, and he shows that this projection can only increase the euclidean length of secret polynomials by a factor √ n 2 . This makes this attack very powerful (even when the modulus q is quite small). Because this projection is a ring morphism, this approach is not limited to NTRU, and would also apply to Ring-SIS or Ring-LWE. In some sense, the line of work by Lauter et al. [ELOS15, EHL14, CLS15] falls in this framework, except that the direct factorization of the rings R happens modulo q: (R/qR) (R 1 /qR 1 ) × (R 2 /qR 2 ). This requires the -seemingly sporadic-property that the projection map π q : (R/qR) → (R 1 /qR 1 ) induces only a manageable geometric distortion. Similar ideas are being explored to attack schemes based on certain quasi-cyclic binary codes [Loi14, LJ14, HT15] .
In comparison, this work tackles NTRU when R = O K is a the ring of integer of a number field K (and therefore can not be a direct product), and that K admit proper subfields. Due to Gentry's attack and others, direct product rings are now avoided for lattice-based cryptography, and the typical choice is to use the rings of integer of cyclotomic number fields R = O Q(ωm) = Z[ω m ]. This setting allows to argue worst-case hardness of certain problems (Ring-SIS [Mic02], Ring-
). Yet all those number fields admit proper subfields (at least, the maximal real subfield). Instead of a projection map π, we exploit a relative norm map N K/L : O K → O L , which is only a multiplicative map. This induces a significant yet manageable blow-up on the euclidean length of secret polynomials and requires a large modulus q. This seems to also limit this attack to the NTRU setting.
Our work also resonates with the logarithm-subfield strategy of Bernstein [Ber14] , which anticipated other works towards a logarithm attack [CGS14, CDPR15] . While the presence of subfields was in the end not necessary for the recovery of short generators of principal ideals in cyclotomic rings, we show in this work that, indeed, the presence of proper subfields can be exploited in other specifics set-ups.
Outline. Section 2 gives preliminaries on the geometry of NTRU lattices and a brief introduction of the lattice reduction algorithms. Section 3 then presents the subfield lattice attack; Subsection 3.4 analyzes its asymptotic performances. In Section 4, we apply our attack to the FHE and MLM constructions proposed in recent literature. In Section 5, we report experimental results for the subfield lattice attack. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and suggests directions for future research. correspondence between the subgroups G of G, and the subfields L of K, G being the subgroup of G fixing L. Let therefore L be a subfield of K and G be the subgroup of G fixing L, and denote n = [L : Q], r = [K : L] (so we have r = n/n ). The number fields K, L and therefore the degrees n, n and relative degree r are fixed in the rest of this work.
The relative norm N K/L : K → L (resp. relative trace Tr K/L : K → L) is the multiplicative (resp. additive) map defined by
(1)
The canonical inclusion L ⊂ K will be written explicitly as L : L → K. The ring of integers of K and L are denoted by O K and O L . A number field of degree n admits n embeddings-i.e. field morphisms-to the complex. Writing K = Q(X)/(P (X)) for some monic irreducible polynomial P , and letting α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ C be the distinct complex roots of P , each embedding e i : K → C consist at evaluating a ∈ K at a root α i , formally e i : a → a(α i ). The Galois group acts by permutation on the set of embeddings.
Cyclotomic Number Field. We denote by ω m an arbitrary primitive m-th root of unity. For cryptanalytic purposes, we are mostly interested in the case where K = Q(ω m ) is the m-th cyclotomic number field, but we want to instantiate our attack for subfields L of K that are not necessary cyclotomic number fields.
The number field K = Q(ω m ) has degree n = φ(m), and has a Galois group isomorphic to Z * m : explicitly i ∈ Z * m corresponds to the automorphism ψ i : ω m → ω i m . Any number field Q(ω m ) for m |m is a subfield of Q(ω m ), but there are other proper subfields. In particular, the maximal real subfield Q(ω m +ω m ) is a proper subfield of degree n/2, and more generally, K = Q(ω m ) admits a subfield of degree n for any divisor n |n 5 .
We recall (see [Was97] , Theorem 2.6) that the ring of integers of K = Q(ω m ) is exactly
Coprimality in O K
Below, we will rely on two principal ideals in O K being coprime in some proofs. The density of coprime pairs of ideals [Sit10] and elements [FM14] in O K is 1/ζ K (2) where ζ K denotes the Dedekind zeta function over K. The next lemma shows that ζ K (2) ≤ ζ(2) where ζ is the Riemann zeta function for any K. Lemma 1. If K is an extension of L, then ζ K (s) ≤ ζ L (s) for any real s > 1. In particular
where ζ is the Riemann zeta function.
Proof. We have
Each prime ideal P of K contains a prime ideal p that lies below in L. The absolute norm of P is no smaller than that of p; and hence the claim follows.
5 For example, 7 is prime, so Q(ω7) admits no cyclotomic number fields as proper subfields, yet it admits two proper subfields: Q(ω7 +ω7) of degree 3 and Q(ω7 + ω 2 7 + ω 4 7 ) of degree 2.
We have a lower bound 6/π 2 for the density. Further, we numerically approximated ζ −1 K (2) for K = Q[x]/(x n + 1) for n = 128 and n = 256 by computing the first 2 22 terms of the Dirichlet series of the Dedekind zeta function for K and then evaluated the truncated series at 2. In both cases we get a density ≈ 0.75.
We stress that our pairs f , g are principal ideals with short generators under the additional condition that f is invertible modulo q. However, our experiments indicate that we may heuristically use the density discussed above as the probability of our pairs being coprime.
Euclidean geometry
The number field K (or L) is viewed as a Euclidean Q-vector space by endowing it with the inner product
where e ranges over all the n (or n ) embeddings K → C. This defines a Euclidean norm denoted by · . In addition to the Euclidean norm, we will make use of the operator norm | · | defined by:
It is easy to check that the operator norm |a| of a equals to the maximal absolute complex embedding of a:
where e ranges over all the embeddings e : K → C. We note that if ω ∈ K is a root of unity, then |ω| = 1. The Euclidean norm and the operator norm are invariant under automorphisms ψ : K → K, a = ψ(a) , |a| = |ψ(a)| (5) since the group of automorphisms acts by permutation on the set of embeddings. One also verifies that L(a) 2 = r a 2 for all a ∈ L. Additionally, the algebraic norm can be bounded in term of geometric norms: N K/Q (a) ≤ |a| n ≤ a n .
The inner product (and therefore the Euclidean norm) are extended in a coefficient-wise manner to vectors of K d : (a 1 , . . . , a d ),
denotes the expectation of a random variable.
Remark. In most theoretical work, the distributions of secrets or errors are spherical discrete Gaussian distribution over O K which are isotropic -up to negligible statistical distance. For simplicity, some practically oriented work instead chose random ternary coefficients. In the typical power-of-two case cyclotomic case, such distribution is isotropic of variance n2/3. Yet, for more general choices K = Q(ω m ), in the worse case (when m is composed of many small distinct prime factor), this may induce up to quasi-polynomial distortion n log(n) (see [LPR10] ). Such set-up choice should only marginally affect our asymptotic results.
O K modules and lattices
To avoid confusion, we shall speak of the rank of O K -modules and of K-vectors-spaces when K = Q, and restrict the term of dimension to Z-modules and Q-vector spaces. The dimension dim(Λ) of a lattice Λ is the dimension over Q of the Q-vector space it spans 6 . We recall that the minimal distance of a lattice Λ is defined as λ 1 (Λ) = min v∈Λ\{0} v . Also, the volume of a lattice Vol(Λ) is defined as square root of the absolute determinant of the Gram matrix of any basis
. For any set of Q-linearly independent vectors {v 1 , . . . , v dim(Λ) } ⊂ Λ, we have the inequality:
The rank of an O K module M ⊂ K d can be defined as the rank over K of the K vector-space it spans, but it does not necessary equal to the size of a minimal set of O K -generators 7 . The Euclidean vector space structure of K d allows to view any discrete O K -module M ⊂ K d as a lattice. The discriminant ∆ K of a number field relates to the volume of its ring of integers |∆ K | = Vol(O K ). It is a positive integer. More generally, we have the identity:
This gives rise to a lower bound on the volume O K -modules of rank 1 in term of its minimal distance:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that d = 1 (by constructing a K-linear isometry ι : Span K (M ) → K⊗ Q R). Let a ∈ K⊗ Q R be a shortest vector of M , we have M ⊃ aO K , therefore Vol(M ) ≤ Vol(aO K ) = N K/Q (a) |∆ K |, and we conclude noting that N K/Q (a) ≤ a n .
NTRU assumption
Let us first describe the NTRU problem as follows.
Definition 2 (NTRU problem). The NTRU problem is defined by four parameters: a ring R (of rank n and endowed with an inner product), a modulus q, a distribution D, and a target norm τ . Precisely, NTRU(R, q, D, τ ) is the problem of, given h = [gf −1 ] q (conditioned on f being invertible mod q) for f, g ← D, finding a vector (x, y) ∈ R 2 such that (x, y) = (0, 0) mod q and of Euclidean norm less than τ √ 2n in the lattice
We may abuse notation and denote NTRU(R, q, σ, τ ) for NTRU(R, q, D, τ ) where D is any reasonable isotropic distribution of variance σ 2 .
Note that NTRU(R, q, σ, σ) is essentially the problem of recovering the secret key (f, g). Yet, in many cases, solving NTRU(R, q, σ, τ ) for some τ > σ is enough to break NTRU-like cryptosystems.
The NTRU lattice Λ q h . The lattice Λ q h defined by the instance h ← NTRU(O K , q, σ, τ ) has dimension 2n and volume Vol(R) 2 q n . Consequently, if h were to be uniformly random, the Gaussian heuristic predicts that the shortest vectors of Λ q h have norm Vol(R) 1/n nq/πe. Therefore, whenever σ < Vol(R) 1/n q/2πe, the lattice Λ q h admits an unusually short vector. This vector is not formally a unique shortest vector:
Target parameter τ for attacks. Because no solution would be expected if h was uniformly random, note that solving h ← NTRU(R, q, σ, τ ) for τ < Vol(R) 1/n q/πe already constitutes a distinguishing attack on the NTRU problem. The problem of distinguishing h from uniform is also known as the Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio problem [LTV12] . As we discuss in Section 4, solving NTRU for such τ would break the FHE scheme based on NTRU from [LTV12] and typical parameter choices for the scheme presented in [BLLN13] .
Lattice reduction algorithms
Theoretically, one of the best lattice-reduction algorithm beyond LLL [LLL82] is the slide algorithm [Sch87, GN08] .
Theorem 1 (from [GN08] ). There is an algorithm that, given > 0, the basis B of a lattice L of dimension d, and performing at most
many operations and calls to an SVP oracle in dimension β, outputs a vector v ∈ L whose length verify both following bounds:
the approximation-factor bound:
where λ 1 (L) is the length of a shortest vector in L. the Hermite-factor bound:
where γ β ≈ β is the β-dimensional Hermite constant.
Alternatively, one may use BKZ with early termination, and a similar Hermite-factor inequality may be proved [HS07] . However, we are not aware of any proof of a similar approximation factor is known unless we leave BKZ running for super-polynomial time.
It is well known [CN11] that in practice lattice reduction algorithms achieve much shorter results and are more efficient, but the factors remains of the order of β Θ(n/β) , for a computational cost in poly(λ) · 2 Θ(β) .
The subfield lattice attack
The subfield lattice attack works in three steps. First we map the NTRU instance to the chosen subfield, then we apply lattice reduction, and finally we lift the solution to the full field. We first describe the three steps of the attacks in Subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. We then analyze in Subsection 3.4 the asymptotic performances compared to direct reduction in the full field for cryptographically relevant asymptotic parameters.
We are given an instance h ← NTRU(O K , q, σ, τ ), and (f, g) ∈ O K is the associated secret. We wish to recover a short vector of Λ q h .
Norming down
We define f = N K/L (f ), g = N K/L (g), and h = N K/L (h). The subfield attack follows from the following observation: (f , g ) is a vector of Λ q h and depending on the parameters it may be an unusually short one.
Lemma 3. Let f, g ∈ O K ⊗ Q R be sampled from continuous spherical Gaussians of variance σ 2 . For any constant c > 0, there exists a constant C, such that,
Proof. For all embeddings e : K → C, it simultaneously holds that
except with polynomially small probability O(n −c ). Once this is established, the conclusion follows using the invariant |ψ(a)| = |a| since f = ψ(f ), where ψ ranges over r automorphisms of K.
To prove inequality (12), note that for each embedding e, the (e(f )) and (e(f )) follow a Gaussian distribution of parameter Θ(n)σ. Classical tails inequality gives the upper bound |e(f )| ≤ σn C . For the lower bound, we remark that the probability density function of a Gaussian of parameter Θ(n)σ is bounded by 1/(Θ(n)σ). This implies that the probability that a sample falls in the range 1 Θ(n)σ [− , ] is less than 2 . It remains to choose = Θ(n −c−1 ) which gives the conclusion by the union-bound.
In this work, we assume that Lemma 3 holds also for all reasonable distributions considered in cryptographic constructions.
Heuristic 1 For any m and any f, g ∈ O K with reasonable isotropic distribution of variance σ 2 , and any constant c > 0, there exists a constant C, such that,
Lattice reduction in the subfield
We now apply a lattice reduction algorithm with block-size β to the lattice Λ q h , and according to the approximation factor bound (10) we obtain a vector (x , y ) ∈ Λ q h of norm:
Next, we argue that if the vector (x , y ) is short enough, then it must be an O K -multiple of (f , g ). In turn, this will allow us to lift (x , y ) to a short vector in the full lattice Λ q h . Theorem 2. Let f , g ∈ O L be such that f and g are coprime ideals and that
Proof. We first prove that that
The argument is adapted from [HHGP + 03], Section 4.1. By coprimality, there exists (F , G ) such that f G − g F = q ∈ O L . We note that:
That is, the module M generated by B contains qO 2 L and (1,
, and therefore M = Λ q h . We denote Λ = (f , g )O L and Λ * the projection of (F , G )O L orthogonally to Λ. Let s * of length λ * 1 be a shortest vector of Λ * . We will conclude using the fact that any vector of Λ q h of length less than λ * 1 must belong to the sublattice Λ. It remains to give an lower bound for λ * 1 . We will rely on the identity Vol(Λ) · Vol(Λ * ) = Vol(Λ q h ) = |∆ L |q n . By Lemma 2, we have
We note that according to Heuristic 1, the length condition of Theorem 2 are satisfied asymptotically when
The probability of satisfying the coprimality condition for random f , g is discussed in Section 2.2, where we argue it to be larger than a constant. On the other hand, experiments (cf. Section 5) show that the co-primality condition does not seems necessary in practice for the subfield lattice attack to succeed.
The partial conclusion is that, one may recover non-trivial information about f and gnamely, a small multiple of (f , g ) -by solving an NTRU instance in a subfield. Depending on the parameters, this new problem is potentially easier as the dimension n = n/r of O L is significantly smaller than the dimension 2n of the full lattice Λ q h .
Lifting the short vector
It remains to lift the solution from the sub-ring O L to O K . Simply compute the vector (x, y) where
We setf = L(f )/f ,g = L(g )/g andh = L(h )/h and note thatf ,g andh are integers of K.
We rewrite
That is, under condition (18) we have found a short multiple of (f, g):
Not only we have found a short vector of Λ q h , but also have the guarantee that it is an O K -multiple of the secret key (f, g). This second property will prove useful to mount attacks on the graded encoding schemes [GGH13a] .
Asymptotic performance
We demonstrate the complexity of the subfield attack for two extreme cases. In both cases, all parameters are expressed in term of a security parameter λ, and are such that the previously best known attack required time greater than 2 λ . Additionally, it is assumed that K contains enough subfield so that a subfield L of the desired relative degree r exists . This condition is verified asymptotically for the typical choice K = Q(ω 2 k ).
In the first case, we set q = 2Θ (λ) , and the subfield attack is polynomial in the security parameter. For the second case, we show that as soon as the gap q gets super-polynomial, the subfield attack can be made sub-exponential.
Remark. Our analysis does not rule out that the attack may even be relevant even for polynomial gaps q/σ: it could be that it remains exponential but with a better constant than the direct attack.
Exponential and super-exponential q. We set: n = Θ(λ 2 log 2 λ), q = exp(Θ(λ log 2 λ)), σ = poly(λ) .
(20)
Complexity of the direct lattice attack. With such parameters, using 2 λ operations, we argue that one may not find any vector shorter than λ 1 (qO K ) = q √ n. Indeed, one may run lattice reduction up to block-size β = Θ(λ). Either from approximation bound or hermit bound, the vector found should not be shorter than:
We verify that having such choice of super-quadratic n makes the Kirchner-Fouque [KF15] attack at least exponential in λ: exp(Θ(n/ log log q)) = exp(Θ(λ 2 log 2 λ/ log λ)) > exp(Θ(λ)).
Complexity of the subfield attack. In contrast, the same parameters allows the subfield attack to recover a vector of norm less than √ q in polynomial time: set r = Θ(λ) and β = Θ(log λ). Then, the vector found will have norm β Θ(n/βr) · n Θ(r) = exp Θ λ 2 log λ log log λ λ log λ + λ log λ
= exp (Θ(λ log λ log log λ)) < √ q.
Similarly, setting n = Θ λ 2 , q = exp(Θ(λ)), β = Θ log 1+ε λ , r = Θ (λ/ (log (λ) log log λ)) leads to a quasi-polynomial version of the subfield attack for exponential q.
Quasi-polynomial q. We set n = Θ (λlog (λ) ε log log (λ)) , q = exp(Θ(log 1+ε λ)), σ = poly(λ) .
We verify that having such choice of super-linear n makes the Kirshner-Fouque [KF15] attack at least exponential in λ: exp(Θ(n/ log log q)) = exp(Θ (λlog (λ) ε log log (λ)/ log log 1+ε λ)) > exp(Θ(λ)).
Complexity of the subfield attack. In contrast, the same parameters allows the subfield attack to recover a vector of norm less than √ q in sub-exponential time exp(λ/ log /3 λ): set r = Θ(log 2 /3 λ) and β = Θ(λ/ log /3 λ). Then, the vector found will have norm
Applications
We apply our attack to FHE and MLM constructions from the literature. To match the definitions of rings and lengths often used in this literature, we restrict our discussion to cyclotomic fields K = Q(ω m ), m a power of 2, and speak of the ring R = Z q [X]/(X n + 1) O K endowed with the cannonical inner product of its coefficients vector. The ring isomorphism µ : R → O K is a scaled isometry: µ(x) = √ n x . This normalization is quite convenient, for example 1 R = 1.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
NTRU-like schemes are used to realise fully homomorphic encryption starting with the LTV scheme from [LTV12] ; the scheme was optimized and implemented in [DHS15]. LTV is motivated by [SS11] which shows that under certain choices of parameter the security of an NTRU-like scheme can be reduced to security of Ring-LWE. That is, [SS11] shows that if f and g have norms > √ q · poly (λ), then h = [f /g] q ∈ Z q [X]/(X n + 1) -with n a power of two -is statistically indistinguishable from a uniformly sampled element. Note that under this choice of parameters the subfield lattice attack does not apply. However, this choice of parameters rules out even performing one polynomial multiplication and hence the schemes in [LTV12,DHS15] are based on an additional assumption that [f /g] q is computationally indistinguishable from random even when f and g are small. This assumption -which essentially states that Decisional-NTRU is hard -is called the Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio assumption (DSPR) in [LTV12] . Note that this work shows that DSPR does not hold for all choices of parameters.
LTV can evaluate circuits of depth L = O (n ε / log(n)) for q = 2 n ε with ε ∈ (0, 1) and its decryption circuit can be implemented in depth O (log log(q) + log(n)). This implies log(n ε+1 ) < n ε / log(n), log(n ε+1 ) < log(q)/ log(n), i.e. that q must be super-polynomial in n to realise fully homomorphic encryption from LTV.
A scale-invariant variant of the scheme in [LTV12] called YASHE was proposed in [BLLN13] . This variant does away with the need for the DSPR assumption by reducing the noise growth during multiplication. This allows f and g to be sampled from a sufficiently wide Gaussian, such that the reduction in [SS11] goes through. Sampling f and g this way allows to evaluate circuits of depth L = O log(q) log log(q)+log(n) [BLLN13, Theorem 2] for Z 2 being the plaintext space.
On the other hand, setting the bounds on f, g to f ∞ = g ∞ = B key = 1, the plaintext space to Z 2 via t = 2, the multiplicative expansion factor of the ring to δ = n by assuming n is a power of two and w = O(1), then the multiplicative expansion factor of YASHE is O n 2 . For correctness, it is required that the noise is < q/4. Hence, to evaluate a circuit of depth
under this choice of parameters. As a consequence, YASHE is usually instantiated with f and g very short, cf. [LN14] .
Following [BV11, Lemma 4.5], Appendix H of [BLLN13] shows that YASHE is bootstrapable if it can evaluat depth L = O (log(log(q)) + log(n)) circuits. For f ∞ = g ∞ = B key = 1 this implies log log(q) + log(n) < log(q)/ log(n), log(n log(q)) < log(q)/ log(n), i.e. q must be super-polynomial in n for YASHE to provide fully homomorphic encryption.
To establish a target size, recall that NTRU-like encryption of a binary message µ ∈ Z 2 is given by c = h · e 1 + e 2 + µ q/2 for random errors of variance ς 2 . To decrypt from a solution (F, G) to the instance h ← NTRU(R, q, σ, τ ), simply compute F c = G · e 1 + F · e 2 + F · µ q/2 . The error term G · e 1 + F · e 2 will have entries of magnitudes ςτ √ n which we require to be < q/2 to decrypt correctly. Hence, we require F, G < q/(2 ς √ n). In [LTV12,BLLN13] like in other FHE schemes, ς is chosen to be bounded by a very small, constant value.
In [CS15] several Ring-based FHE schemes are compared. For comparability amongst the considered schemes and performance, the authors choose the coefficients of f, g from {−1, 0, 1} with the additional guarantee that only 64 coefficients are non-zero in f or g. Then, to establish hardness they assume that an adversary which can find an element < q in a q-ary lattice with dimension m and volume q n wins for all schemes considered. Now, to achieve security against lattice attacks, the root Hermite factor δ 0 in q = δ m 0 q n/m should be small enough, where "small enough" depends on which prediction for lattice reduction is used. In [DHS15] the same approach is used to pick parameters, but for a slightly smaller target norm of q/4.
The attack presented in this work results in a subexponential attack in the security parameter λ for LTV and YASHE, if L is sufficiently big to enable fully homomorphic encryption and if n is chosen to be minimal such that a lattice attack on the full field does not succeed. Set q = exp Θ ( + 1) log 2 n to satisfy correctness. Now, to rule out lattice attacks on the full field set n = Θ λ log (λ) log log 2 (λ) . Hence, for β = λ we have
Now, for the subfield attack, pick β = Θ λ/log 1/3 (λ) and r = Θ log (λ) 2/3 and we get β Θ(n/β r) · n Θ(r) < √ q Θ log 5 3 (λ) log log 2 (λ) < Θ log 2 (λ) .
Graded Encoding Schemes
In [GGH13a] a candidate construction for graded encoding schemes approximating multilinear maps was proposed. The GGH construction was improved in [LSS14] and implemented and improved further in [ACLL15] . In these schemes, short elements m i ∈ Z[X]/(X n + 1) are encoded as [(r i · g + m i )/z] q ∈ R/qR for some r i , g with norms of size poly(λ) and some random z. For correctness, the latest improvements [ACLL15] require a modulus q = poly (λ) κ , where κ is the multi-linearity level. The subfield attack is therefore applicable in sub-exponential time for any κ = log λ, according to Section 3.4, and would become polynomial for κ > Θ(λ log λ). In practice, the fact that the constants in the exponent q = λ Θ(κ) is quite large could make this attack quite powerful even for small degrees of multi-linearity. While initially these constructions permitted the inclusion of encodings of zero (m i = 0) to achieve multilinear maps, it was shown that these encodings break security [HJ15] . Without such encodings, the construction still serves as building-block for realizing Indistinguishability Obfuscation [GGH + 13b].
To estimate parameters, [ACLL15] proceeds as follows 8 . Given encodings x 0 = [(r 0 · g + m 0 )/z] q and x 1 = [(r 1 · g + m 1 )/z] q for unknown m 0 , m 1 = 0 we may consider the NTRU lattice Λ q h where h = [x 0 /x 1 ] q . This lattice contains a short vector (r 0 · g + m 0 , r 1 · g + m 1 ). In [ACLL15] all elements of norm ≈ r 0 · g + m 0 = σ 1 are considered "interesting" and recovering any such element is considered an attack. This is motivated by the fact that if an attacker recovers r 0 · g + m 0 exactly, then it can recover z. This completely breaks the scheme.
The subfield lattice attack does not yield the vector (r 0 · g + m 0 , r 1 · g + m 1 ) exactly but only a relatively small multiple of it u(r 0 · g + m 0 , r 1 · g + m 1 ). We provide two approaches to completely break the scheme from this small multiple. The first approach consists of solving a principal ideal problem and leads to quantum polynomial-time attack. The second approach relies on a statistical leak using the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm [GS02, LS14] , but is just outside reach with our current tools [GGH13a] . This approach is arguably worrisome, and the authors of [GGH13a] spent significant efforts to rule this approach out completely.
We remark, that unlike previous cryptanalysis advances of multi-linear maps [HJ15] this attack does not rely either on the zero testing parameter, neither on encodings of zero. Our cryptanalytic result therefore impact all applications of multilinear maps, from multi-party key exchange to jigsaw puzzles and Indistinguishability Obfuscation [GGH + 13b]. For completeness, we note that the CLT construction [CLT13] of Graded Encoding Schemes also is suspect to a quantum polynomial-time attack, because it relies on the hardness of factoring large integers.
The principal ideal problem and short generator recovery. The problem of recovering a short principal ideal generator from any generator received a lot of attention recently, and a series of works has lead to subexponential classical and polynomial-time quantum attacks against principal ideal lattices [EHKS14,CGS14,CDPR15,BS16]. Precisely, given the ideal I = g , Biasse and Song [BS16] showed how to recover an arbitrary generator ug of I in quantum polynomial time, extending the recent breakthrough of Eisentrager et al. [EHKS14] on quantum algorithms over large degree number fields. Such results were conjectured already in a note of Cambell et al. [CGS14] , where a classical polynomial time algorithm is also suggested to recover the original g from ug (namely, LLL in the log-unit lattice). The correctness of a similar algorithm was formally established using analytical number theory by Cramer et al. [CDPR15] , when g is sampled according to a spherical Gaussian (may it be discrete or continuous).
In combination with this subfield lattice attack, this directly implies a polynomial quantum attack. Indeed, the subfield lattice attack allows to recover u(r 0 · g + m 0 ) for some relatively short u. Repeating this attack several time, and obtaining u(r 0 · g + m 0 ) for various u eventually leads to the reconstruction of the ideal r 0 · g + m 0 . Because r 0 · g + m 0 follows exactly a discrete Gaussian distribution, the approach sketched above can be applied, and reveals r 0 · g + m 0 exactly, and therefore z.
In conclusion, for any degree of multi-linearity κ the subfield attack can be complemented with a quantum polynomial step to a complete break. Alternatively, when κ = O(λ c ) for any c < 1/2, -leading according to the previous best known attacks to a choice of dimension n =Θ(λ 1+c )the 2Õ (n 2/3 ) algorithm of Biasse [Bia14] leads to a classical attack in time sub-exponential in λ.
The statistical attack. This attacks consists in recovering uū and u and use the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm [GS02,LS14] to recover u.
To recover u , note that we are given u(a 0 , a 1 ). We will assume that a 0 , a 1 are coprime with constant probability, cf. Section 2.2. Under this assumption, u can be recovered as u = ua 0 + ua 1 . 9
To recover more information on u, we can compute ua 0 · [x i /x 0 ] q = ua i for other i > 1, and the equation hold over R because u and a i are small. For i > 1, a i is a independent of u and follows a spherical Gaussian of parameter σ. It follows that the variance of ua i leaks uū:
Given polynomially many samples x i on can therefore recover uū up to a 1 + 1 poly(λ) approximation factor. The original attack of Gentry-Szydlo algorithm [GS02, LS14] requires the exact knowledge of uū that could be obtained by rounding when u has poly-sized coefficient, but unfortunately the u provided by the subfield lattice attack is much larger. In [GGH13a] this algorithm is revisited and extended to when uū is only known up to a 1 + (log n) −Θ(log n) approximation factor.
In conclusion, with the current algorithmic tools this approach is asymptotically inapplicable if we assume only a polynomial number of available samples, but only barely so. This raises the question of how to improve the tolerance of the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm 10 . Yet, because (log n) Θ(log n) is arguably not so large, it is unclear whether this approach is really infeasible in practice.
We concur with the decision made in [GGH13a] , to attempt to rule out such an attack by design even if it is not yet known how to fully exploit it.
Experimental Verification
We report on the experiments we performed. As in the previous section, this report considers the ring R = Z q [X]/(X n + 1) O K for n a power of 2, and endowed with the cannonical inner product of its coefficients vector: Euclidean lengths are scaled so that 1 R = 1.
We chose q to be the first prime greater than 2 k for integers k in certain range, with the additional constraint that the field of order q should have a 2n-th root of unity to allow the application of the number theoretic transform (NTT). In each case, the secret (f, g) was chosen as a uniform ternary vector, which, in the power of two case is an isotropic distribution of variance σ 2 = 2/3.
There are two trials for each set of parameters. We used LLL 11 for the lattice reduction step in the subfield case. For comparison, we also provide the prediction of the required BKZ block-size for a full field attack (ffa). Our experimental results are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4, corresponding to parameter sets (n, n ) = (2 11 , 2 7 ), (n, n ) = (2 11 , 2 8 ) and (n, n ) = (2 12 , 2 8 ) respectively.
Remark. In several cases, the value v such that (x , y ) = v(f , g ) exists in L, but is only a half integer: 2v ∈ O L , yet v ∈ O L . Those exceptions are marked with a asterisk (Yes * ) in the "∃v?" column. Those exceptions happened only when both N K/Q (f ) and N K/Q (g ) where even: the coprimality conditions of Theorem 2 was not verified, precisely, both norms had 2 as a common factor, and therefore 1 + ω 2n as a common factor 12 . Note that this nevertheless lead to a successful lift.
Conclusions
Practicality of the attack. The largest instance we were able to break in practice with our limited resources is for the set of parameter n = 2 12 , q ≈ 2 190 . Choosing a relative degree r = 16, the attack required to run LLL in 512 dimensions, which took 120 hours, single-threaded, using Sage [Dev15] and Fplll [ABC + ]. The direct lattice reduction attack, according to root-hermitefactor based predictions [CN11] , should have required running BKZ with block-size ≈ 130, and in 8192 dimensions, which is hardly feasible with the current state-of-the art [CN11] (requiring more than 2 70 CPU cycles). We conclude that the attack is not only theoretical but also practical.
Obstructions to concrete predictions. We are currently unable to predict precisely how a given set of parameters would be affected, for example to predict the power of this attack against concrete parameter choices of NTRU-based FHE [LTV12, BLLN13] and Multilinear Maps [GGH13a] .
There are two issues for those predictions. The first issue is that we make use of LLL/BKZ in the approximation-factor regime, not in the Hermite-factor regime. While the behavior of LLL/BKZ is quite well modeled in the latter regime, we are not aware of precise models for the former. Unlike the Hermite-factor regime, this case could very well be influenced by the presence of many short vectors rather than just a few. Our preliminary experiments exhibited undocumented behavior, and a careful study is required.
The second issue is that we do not know the actual size of the shortest vector of Λ q h , all we know is that it is no larger than (f , g ). In several cases (Table 2) we found vectors (x , y ) = v(f , g ) that were actually shorter than (f , g )-the tentative root-approximation factor α is less than 1. One may expect that (f , g ) may still be the shortest vector for small relative degree r as it is most surely the shortest in the full field (i.e. when r = 1).
Immunity of NTRU encryption and BLISS signature schemes? If q is small enough, then our attacks should become inapplicable, even with the smallest possible relative dimension r = 2. Precisely, if (f , g ) is not an unusually short vector of Λ q h , then there is little hope that any lattice reduction strategy would lead to information on this vector. Quantitatively, this total immunity happens when (f , g ) ≈ σ 2 · n > n q/πe. This is unfortunately not the case of the parameters of NTRUencrypt [HPS + 15] and Bliss [DDLL13], for which (f , g ) is an unusually short vector, but not by a very large factor (ranging from 2 to 10). It is plausible, especially for NTRUencrypt, that this is close enough to total immunity to make the sub-field attack more costly than the full attack, but calls for further study.
Note that the immunity to our attack is achieved asymptotically around σ ≈ Θ(q 1/4 ), parameter for which h does not have enough entropy to be statistically close to random. For comparison, it was shown that for σ = ω(q 1/2 ), h is statistically close to uniform [SS11] . We note that σ > Θ(q 1/4 ) could provide enough entropy for the normed-down public key h to be almost uniform. it would be interesting to see if the proof of [SS11] can be extended.
Recommendations. Even if credible predictions were to be made, we strongly discourage basing a scheme on a set-up where this attack applies. Indeed, it is quite likely that the performance of the attack may be improved in several ways. For example, after having found several subfield solutions (x , y ) = v(f , g ), it is possible to run lattice reduction in the lattice (f , g )O L of dimension n rather than 2n to obtain significantly shorter vectors. Additionally, the lifting step may also be improved in the case where O L is a real subfield using the Gentry-Syzdlo algorithm [GS02, LS14] to obtain shorter vector in the full field (i.e. recovering a from N(a)). More generally, the lifting step may be improved by considering the relative norm equation problem [FJP97] . One may recover a from N K/L (a) using ideal factorization problem, followed by a recovery of short generator of principal ideals step; as mentionned before, those problems are now known to be classically sub-exponential [Bia14, CDPR15] or even polynomial for quantum computers [EHKS14, BS16] .
Evaluating concrete security against regular lattice attacks is already a difficult exercise, and leaving open additional algebraic and statistical attack surfaces will only make security assessment intractable. We therefore recommend that this set-up -NTRU assumption, presence of subfields, large modulus-be considered insecure.
Designing Immune Rings. We believe that our work further motivates the design and the study of number fields without subfields fit for the lattice-based cryptographic purposes, as already recommended in [Ber14] . Even for assumptions that are not directly affected by this attack (Ring-SIS [Mic02], Ring-LWE [LPR10]), it could be considered desirable to have efficient fall-back options ready to use, in case subfields induces other unforeseen weaknesses. While this work does not suggest an immediate threat to Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE, such a precaution is not unreasonable.
A worthy option was suggested in [Ber14] : rings of the form Z[X]/(X p − X − 1). We are unfortunately unaware of a detailed study of that ring for lattice-based cryptography purposes. It has been remarked that the total absence of non-trivial automorphisms could be quite problematic for the batch-efficiency of certain FHE schemes as HElib [HS14] . Similarly, the alternative scheme FHEW [DM15] would suffer from the absence of roots of unity.
Another interesting option is to choose p as a safe prime 13 and to work with the ring of integer of the totally real number field K = Q(ζ p +ζ p ). The field remains Galois, and its automorphism group may still allow a quantum worst-case (Ideal-SVP) to average-case (Ring-LWE) reduction a-la [LPR10] thanks to a generalization of the search to decision step presented in [CLS15] . Nevertheless because the Galois group has prime order p−1 2 , it has no proper subgroups, and K has no proper subfields. In practice, such rings may perform decently well, since, for example, the fast Fourier transform can benefit from a two-fold acceleration when the Fourier coefficients are all reals. 
